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Abstract—This paper develops a tractable framework for
exploiting the potential benefits of physical layer security in
three-tier wireless sensor networks using stochastic geometry.
In such networks, the sensing data from the remote sensors
are collected by sinks with the help of access points, and the
external eavesdroppers intercept the data transmissions. We focus
on the secure transmission in two scenarios: i) the active sensors
transmit their sensing data to the access points, and ii) the
active access points forward the data to the sinks. We derive
new compact expressions for the average secrecy rate in these
two scenarios. We also derive a new compact expression for the
overall average secrecy rate. Numerical results corroborate our
analysis and show that multiple antennas at the access points
can enhance the security of three-tier wireless sensor networks.
Our results show that increasing the number of access points
decreases the average secrecy rate between the access point and
its associated sink. However, we find that increasing the number
of access points first increases the overall average secrecy rate,
with a critical value beyond which the overall average secrecy
rate then decreases. When increasing the number of active
sensors, both the average secrecy rate between the sensor and
its associated access point and the overall average secrecy rate
decrease. In contrast, increasing the number of sinks improves
both the average secrecy rate between the access point and its
associated sink, as well as the overall average secrecy rate.
Index Terms—Beamforming, decode-and-forward (DF), phys-
ical layer security, stochastic geometry, wireless sensor networks
(WSNs).
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to its wide applications such as environmental sensing,
health monitoring, and military communications [1], wireless
sensor networks (WSNs) have attracted considerable attention
from the industry and academia. The security of WSNs is a
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big concern, since the broadcast nature of wireless channels is
susceptible to eavesdropping and the sensing data needs to be
protected. In practice, the small-size, low-cost and low-power
sensors are randomly deployed to sense the data, which is sent
back to the sinks by multihop transmissions. Multihop archi-
tectures pose great challenges to conventional cryptographic
methods involving key distribution and management, and
result in high complexity in data encryption and decryption.
Physical layer security has emerged as an appealing low-
complexity approach to secure the information transmission.
The core idea behind it is to exploit the characteristics of
wireless channels such as fading or noise to transmit a message
from a source to an intended destination while keeping the
message confidential from eavesdroppers. Motivated by this,
the potential applications of physical layer security have been
investigated in various wireless networks such as cellular
networks, cognitive radio, ad-hoc, etc.
A. Physical Layer Security: Current State-of-the-Art
In the 1970s, Aaron D. Wyner first introduced physical
layer security [2]. Triggered by the rapid evolution of wireless
network architectures, the idea of enabling security at physical
layer has drawn the attention of the wireless community [3].
In cellular networks, physical layer security is important for
adding an extra level of protection [4, 5]. In [4], secure
downlink transmission in cellular networks was investigated,
and the secrecy using linear precoding based on regularized
channel inversion was examined. In multi-cell environments,
the cell association and location information of mobile users
play an important role in secrecy performance [5]. Although it
can alleviate the scarcity of radio frequency spectrum, security
of cognitive radio networks is critical as it is easily exposed to
external threats [6]. In [6], the optimal secrecy beamforming in
a multiple-input single-output (MISO) cognitive radio wiretap
channel was proposed. In cooperative networks, relays are de-
ployed to boost the coverage and reliability, however, the relay
can be trusted [7, 8] or untrusted [9, 10] where the untrusted
relay is thought of as an eavesdropper. In [7], the design of
trusted relay weights and allocation of transmit power under
different relay protocols such as amplify-and-forward (AF),
decode-and-forward (DF), and cooperative jamming (CJ) was
considered. In [8], trusted relay selection schemes based on
the AF and DF protocols were proposed to improve physical
layer security. In untrusted relay networks, CJ was introduced
to confuse the untrusted relay [9]. Joint power allocation and
CJ was developed in [10], and it was shown that a positive
1
2secrecy rate can be guaranteed. In decentralized networks
such as ad-hoc, the public-key cryptography is expensive and
difficult [11–13]. In [11], the secure connectivity in wireless
random networks was studied, and the eigen-beamforming
was implemented to maximize the signal strength to the
intended receiver. In [12], the secrecy transmission capacity
in wireless ad-hoc networks was analyzed, and the secrecy
guard zone was introduced to improve the secrecy transmission
capacity. In [13], the transmit beamforming with artificial
noise strategies were used to enhance the secrecy in large-
scale ad-hoc networks.
Physical layer security schemes have been recently proposed
for WSNs to combat eavesdropping [14–17]. In [14], the
downlink secure transmission from the mobile agent to the
authorized user was considered and perfect secrecy can be
achieved by intentionally creating channel variation. In [15], a
detection problem under physical layer secrecy constraints in
an energy-constrained WSNs was addressed, and the optimal
operative solutions were analyzed. In [16], sensor transmis-
sions were observed by the authorized fusion center (FC) and
unauthorized (third party) FC. It was shown that physical layer
security for distributed detection is scalable due to its low
computational complexity. More recently in [17], compressed
sensing (CS) was introduced to provide secrecy against eaves-
dropping in addition to the other CS benefits.
B. Approach and Contributions
In this paper, we examine the potential benefits of physical
layer security in a three-tier WSN using stochastic geometry
modeling. In three-tier WSNs, the sensors are located far from
the sinks, and the access points are deployed to help the sen-
sors forward their data to the sinks. Confidential information
transmissions are intercepted by the eavesdroppers. Consid-
ering the fact that sensors are densely deployed and their
locations are randomly distributed [1], we introduce stochastic
geometry to model the locations of the nodes in WSNs.
Such a modeling approach has been applied in heterogeneous
networks [18] and cognitive radio networks [19]. Our main
contributions are summarized as follows.
• We develop a new analytical framework to examine the
implementation of physical layer security in three-tier
WSNs. The locations and spatial densities of sensors,
access points, sinks, and eavesdroppers are modeled using
stochastic geometry. Each access point is equipped with
multiple antennas and uses the low-complexity maximal-
ratio combining (MRC) to receive the data signals from
the sensors and maximal-ratio transmission (MRT) beam-
former to transmit the signals. We investigate the se-
cure transmissions between the active sensors and access
points, and beween the active access points and sinks.
• We present new statistical properties, based on which we
derive new compact expressions for the average secrecy
rate between the typical sensor and its associated access
point, and between the typical access point and its associ-
ated sink. We also derive the minimum number of sinks
required for a target average secrecy rate. Particularly,
we derive a new compact expression for overall average
secrecy rate in three-tier WSNs.
TABLE I
NOTATION
Φs,a Poison point process (PPP) of sensor locations
λs Intensity of Φs
Φap,a PPP of access points locations
λap Intensity of Φap
Φsk PPP of sinks locations
λsk Intensity of Φsk
ρs The probability that sensor is triggered to transmit
the data
ρap The activity probability of access point that forwards
the data to the sinks
Φs,e PPP of eavesdropper locations, where the eavesdroppers
intercept the sensors’ data
Φap,e PPP of eavesdropper locations, where the eavesdroppers
intercept the access points’ data
λse Intensity of Φs,e
λ
ap
e Intensity of Φap,e
† Conjugate transpose
Sensing field Access points Sinks
Eavesdropper
Sensor
Access point Sink
Fig. 1. Illustration of three-tier wireless sensor networks, where the sensors
transmit the data to the sinks via the access points, in the presence of
eavesdropping.
• We show that using MRC/MRT at access points can
enhance the secure transmission. Based on the proposed
analysis and simulations, several important observations
are reached: 1) the average secrecy rate decreases as the
number of sensors grows large, due to more interference
from sensors, 2) the average secrecy rate increases with
increasing the number of sinks, because of the shorter
distances between the access points and their associated
sinks, and 3) the overall average secrecy rate increases
with increasing the number of access points. However,
beyond a critical value, the overall average secrecy rate
decreases with increasing the number of access points.
The notation of this paper is given in Table I-B.
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
As shown in Fig. 1, a three-tier WSN is considered, where
the geographically remote sensors transmit the sensed data
to the sinks with the help of half-duplex decode-and-forward
(DF) access points with no direct links between sensors
and sinks. The eavesdroppers overhears the data transmission
without modifying it. In the sensing field, sensors are randomly
located according to a homogeneous Poisson point process
(HPPP) Φs with intensity λs. In order to consider unplanned
deployment of the access points and sinks, the random lo-
cations of the access points and sinks are approximated as
independent HPPPs Φap and Φsk with intensities λap and λsk,
respectively, which is suitable in large scale networks [20].
3Since the sensors may transmit data intermittently, the activity
probability of a sensor that is triggered to transmit the data is
denoted as ρs (0 < ρs < 1), and the activity probability of
an access point that forwards the data to the sink is denoted
as ρap (0 < ρap < 1)1. We assume that the probability of
being an active sensor/access point is independent of the access
point/sink’s location. Therefore, the active sensors and active
access points constitute independent HPPPs Φs,a and Φap,a
with intensities λsρs and λapρap, respectively [20]. Non-
colluding eavesdroppers are considered and eavesdroppers’ lo-
cations are modeled as two independent HPPPs Φs,e and Φap,e
with intensities λse and λape , respectively. The eavesdroppers
in Φs,e intercept the data transmitted by the sensors and the
eavesdroppers in Φap,e intercept the data transmitted by the
access points. Note that the eavesdroppers in Φs,e and in Φap,e
are far from each other.
In this three-tier network, the sensor is associated with its
nearest access point to receive the sensor’s data and the access
point is associated with its nearest sink to receive the access
point’s data 2. Each access point is equipped with M antennas,
and the sensors and sinks are single-antenna nodes. To enhance
the information transmission, the access points use MRC to
receive the sensors’ data signals and MRT beamformer to
transmit the signals. The wireless channels are modeled as
independent quasi-static Rayleigh fading.
An arbitrary typical sensor o transmits data to its nearest
access point (called typical access point). The typical access
point not only receives the useful data from the typical
sensor, but is also subject to the interference from other
active sensors and active access points. Thus, the receive
signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) after MRC at its
corresponding typical access point is given by
γap =
‖hs0,ap0‖
2
|Xs0,ap0 |
−α
Is,ap + Iap,ap︸ ︷︷ ︸
Inap
+δ2
/
Ps
, (1)
where Is,ap =
∑
i∈Φs,a\{s0}
∣∣∣∣ hs0,ap0†‖hs0,ap0‖hi,ap0
∣∣∣∣2|Xi,ap0 |−α,
Iap,ap = µ
∑
j∈Φap,a\{ap0}
∣∣∣∣ hs0,ap0 †‖hs0,ap0‖Hj,ap0 hj,skj
†
‖hj,skj‖
∣∣∣∣2|Xj,ap0 |−α,
and µ = Pap/Ps. Note that the interfering access points
deliver their own data to their corresponding sinks using
MRT beamformer vector hj,skj
†
‖hj,skj‖
, which are also received
and combined at the typical access point with MRC vector
hs0,ap0
†
‖hs0,ap0‖
. Here, hs0,ap0 and |Xs0,ap0 | are the channel fading
vector and distance between the typical sensor and its typical
access point, respectively, α is the path loss exponent,
1In practical scenarios, the access points operate in three modes: receiving
the sensed data from active sensors, forwarding the sensed data to the sinks,
and idle. The activity probability of sensor only determines the number
of access points which receive the data from the active sensors, and is
independent of the number of access points which forward the data to the
sink. The number of active access points that are triggered to forward the
sensed data to sinks depends on the availability of sinks. As such, ρs and
ρap are independent values.
2In reality, there may be more than one active sensor/access point to choose
the same access point/sink; this can be effectively dealt with using multiple
access techniques.
hi,ap0 ∈ C
M×1 and |Xi,ap0 | are the channel fading vector
and distance between the sensor i and the typical access
point, respectively, Hj,ap0 and |Xj,ap0 | are the channel fading
matrix and distance between the interfering access point j
and the typical access point, respectively, hj,skj ∈ C1×M
is the channel fading vector between the interfering access
point j and its corresponding sink, Ps is the sensor’s transmit
power, Pap is the access point’s transmit power, and δ2 is the
noise power.
We consider the non-colluding eavesdropping scenario, in
which the most detrimental eavesdropper that has the highest
receive SINR dominates the secrecy rate [7]. An arbitrary
eavesdropper ek that intercepts the sensor and the access
point transmission overhears the useful signal from the typical
sensor to the typical access point, and simultaneously receives
the interfering data from the other active sensors and active
access points. This eavesdropper suffers from the interfering
signals emitted by the other interfering access points using
the MRT beamformer hj,skk
†
‖hj,skk‖
. Thus, the received SINR at
the most detrimental eavesdropper in Φs,e for the sensor and
the access point transmission is given by
γs,e = max
ek∈Φs,e


|hs0,ek |
2
|Xs0,ek |
−α
Is,e + Iap,e︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ins,e
+δ2
/
Ps

 , (2)
where Is,e =
∑
i∈Φs,a\{s0}
|hi,ek |
2
|Xi,ek |
−α
and
Iap,e =
∑
j∈Φap,a\{ap0}
µ
∣∣∣∣hj,ek hj,skj †‖hj,skj‖
∣∣∣∣2|Xj,ek |−α, hs0,ek
and |Xs0,ek | are the channel fading coefficient and distance
between the typical sensor and the eavesdropper, respectively,
hi,ek and |Xi,ek | are the channel fading coefficient and
distance between sensor i and the eavesdropper, respectively,
and hj,ek and |Xj,ek | are the channel fading vector and
distance between the access point j and the eavesdropper,
respectively.
After receiving the typical sensor’s data, the typical access
point ap0 will forward the sensed data to the nearest sink
(called typical sink) sk0 for data collection. Due to the current
transmission from other active access points, the typical sink
suffers from their interferences. As such, the received SINR
at the typical sink sk0 is given by
γsk =
‖gap0,sk0‖
2
|Xap0,sk0 |
−β
Inap,sk + δ2
/
Pap
, (3)
where Inap,sk =
∑
j∈Φap,a\{ap0}
∣∣∣∣gj,sk0 hj,skj †‖hj,skj‖
∣∣∣∣2|Xj,sk0 |−β ,
gap0,sk0 ∈ C
1×M and |Xap0,sk0 | are the channel fading
vector and distance between the typical access point and
its typical sink, respectively, β is the path loss exponent,
gj,sk0 ∈ C
1×M and |Xj,sk0 | are the channel fading vector
and distance between the access point j and the typical sink,
and hj,skj ∈ C1×M is the channel fading vector between the
access point j and its associated sink.
An arbitrary eavesdropper ek that intercepts the typical
access point and the typical sink transmission overhears the
4signal transmitted by the typical access point with the MRT
beamformer gap0,sk0
†
‖gap0,Sk0‖
, and suffers from the interfering sig-
nals emitted by other interfering access points with the MRT
beamformer hj,skk
†
‖hj,skk‖
. Thus, the received SINR at the most
detrimental eavesdropper for the access point and the sink
transmission is given by
γap,e = max
ek∈Φap,e
{∣∣∣∣gap0,ek gap0,sk0 †‖gap0,Sk0‖
∣∣∣∣2|Xap0,ek |−β
Inap,e + σ2
/
Pap
}
, (4)
where Inap,e =
∑
j∈Φap,a\{ap0}
∣∣∣∣gj,ek hj,skk †‖hj,skk‖
∣∣∣∣2|Xj,ek |−β ,
gap0,ek and |Xap0,ek | are the channel fading coefficient and
distance between the typical access point and the eavesdropper,
respectively, and gj,ek and |Xj,ek | are the channel fading
vector and distance between the access point j and the
eavesdropper, respectively.
III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS
In this section, we characterize the secrecy performance in
terms of average secrecy rate. Before exhibiting the overall
secrecy performance behaviors, we evaluate the secrecy of two
different links, namely the link between the sensor and access
point, and the link between the access point and sink. We
derive new analytical expressions for the average secrecy rate,
and analyze the impact of the two links on the overall average
secrecy rate.
A. Average Secrecy Rate between Sensor and Access Point
We evaluate the average secrecy rate based on the worst-
case, where the eavesdropper with the best SINR is used to
calculate the average secrecy rate [7]. Hence, for a typical link
between a typical sensor and its associated access point, the
instantaneous secrecy rate is defined as [21]
Caps = [Cap − Cs,e]
+, (5)
where [x]+ = max{x, 0}, Cap = log2 (1 + γap) is the
capacity of the channel between the typical sensor and access
point, and Cs,e = log2 (1 + γs,e) is the capacity of the
eavesdropping channel between the typical sensor and the most
detrimental eavesdropper.
1) New Statistics: We derive the cumulative distribution
functions (CDFs) of SINRs at the typical access point and the
most detrimental eavesdropper that intercepts the transmission
between the typical sensor and the access point in Lemma 1
and Lemma 2, respectively.
Lemma 1. The CDF of SINR at the typical access point is
derived as (6) at the top of next page.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Lemma 2. The CDF of SINR at the most detrimental eaves-
dropper which intercepts the transmission between the typical
sensor and the access point is derived as
Fγs,e (γth) =
exp
{
−piλse
∫ ∞
0
exp
{
−
(
λsρs + λapρapµ
2/α
)
pi
Γ (1 + 2/α) Γ (1− 2/α) (γth)
2
α t− δ2γtht
α/2
/
Ps
}
dt. (7)
Proof: See Appendix B.
2) Average Secrecy Rate: Based on our fundamental work
in [22], the average secrecy rate between the sensor and the
access point is the average of secrecy rate Caps over γs,e and
γap, which can be written as
C¯aps =
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
Fγs,e (x)
1 + x
(1− Fγap (x))dx. (8)
By substituting the CDF of γap in (6) and the CDF of γs,e in
(7) into (8), we can obtain the average secrecy rate between
the sensor and the access point.
Note that the derived average secrecy rate between the
sensor and the access point in (8) is not in a simple form. As
such, in the following corollary, we present the interference-
limited case for the average secrecy rate with a single antenna
at the access point.
Corollary 1. When the access points are equipped with sin-
gle antenna in the interference-limited scenario, the average
secrecy rate between the sensor and the access point is given
by
C¯aps =
piλap (1− ρap)
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
exp
{
−piλse
/(
Λ1x
2/α
)}
(1 + x)
(
Λ1x2/α + piλap (1− ρap)
)dx,
(9)
where Λ1 =
(
λsρs + λapρapµ
2
α
)
piΓ (1 + 2/α) Γ (1− 2/α) .
B. Average Secrecy Rate between Access Point and Sink
Similar to (5), for a typical access point and its associated
sink, the instantaneous secrecy rate is defined as
Csks = [Csk − Cap,e]
+, (10)
where Csk = log2 (1 + γsk) and Cap,e = log2 (1 + γap.e).
1) New Statistics: We derive the CDFs of SINRs at the typ-
ical sink and the most detrimental eavesdropper that intercepts
the transmission between the typical access point and the sink
in Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, respectively.
5Fγap (γth) = 1− 2piλap (1− ρap)
∫ ∞
0
r exp
{
−
(
λsρs + λapρapµ
2
α
)
piΓ (1 + 2/α) Γ (1− 2/α) (γth)
2
α r2−γthr
αδ2
/
Ps
−piλap (1− ρap) r
2
}
dr − 2piλap (1− ρap)
M−1∑
m=1
(rα)
m
(−1)m
∑ 1
m∏
l=1
ml!l!ml
∫ ∞
0
r exp
{
−
(
λsρs + λapρapµ
2
α
)
piΓ (1 + 2/α)
Γ (1− 2/α) (γth)
2
α r2 − γthr
αδ2
/
Ps − piλap (1− ρap) r
2
}[
−2/α
(
λsρs + λapρapµ
2
α
)
piΓ (1 + 2/α) Γ (1− 2/α) (γth)
2/α
r(2−α) − γthδ
2
/
Ps
]m1 m∏
l=2
[
−
(
λsρs + λapρapµ
2
α
)
piΓ (1 + 2/α) Γ (1− 2/α)(γth)
2/α
l−1∏
j=0
(2/α− j) r2−lα
]ml
dr, (6)
where
m∑
l=1
l ·ml = m.
Lemma 3. The CDF of SINR at the typical sink is derived as
Fγsk (x) = 1− 2piλsk
∫ ∞
0
r exp
{
−λapρappiΓ (1 + 2/β)
Γ (1− 2/β) (γth)
2
β r2 − γthr
βδ2
/
Pap − piλskr
2
}
dr − 2piλsk
M−1∑
m=1
1
(−1)
m
∑ 1
m∏
l=1
ml!l!ml
∫ ∞
0
rβm+1 exp
{
−λapρappi
Γ (1 + 2/β) Γ (1− 2/β) (γth)
2
β r2 − γthr
βδ2
/
Pap − piλskr
2
}
[
− λapρappi
2
β
Γ (1 + 2/β) Γ (1− 2/β) (γth)
2
β r2−β − γth
δ2
/
Pap
]m1 m∏
l=2
[
− λapρappiΓ (1 + 2/β) Γ (1− 2/β) (γth)
2
β
l−1∏
j=0
(2/β − j) r2−lβ
]ml
dr. (11)
Proof: See Appendix C.
Lemma 4. The CDF of SINR at the most detrimental eaves-
dropper which intercepts the transmission between the typical
access point and the sensor is derived as
Fγap,e (x) = exp
{
−piλape
∫ ∞
0
exp
{
−λapρappiΓ (1 + 2/β)
Γ (1− 2/β) γth
2
β t− σ2γtht
β/2
/
Pap
}
dt
}
. (12)
Proof: See Appendix D.
2) Average Secrecy Rate: The average secrecy rate between
the access point and the sink is the average of the secrecy rate
Csks over γsk and γap,e, which is given by
C¯sks =
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
Fγsk (x)
1 + x
(1− Fγap,e (x))dx. (13)
By substituting the CDF of γsk in (11) and the CDF of γap,e in
(12) into (13), we can obtain the average secrecy rate between
the access point and the sink.
Note that the derived average secrecy rate between the
access point and the sink is also not in a simple form, we
present the interference-limited case for the average secrecy
rate with single antenna at the access point in the following
corollary.
Corollary 2. When the access points are equipped with sin-
gle antenna in the interference-limited scenario, the average
secrecy rate between the access point and the sink is given by
C¯sks =
piλsk
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
exp
{
−piλape
/
Λ2x
2/β
}
(1 + x)
(
Λ2x2/β + piλsk
)dx, (14)
where Λ2 = λapρappiΓ (1 + 2/β) Γ (1− 2/β) . Based on (14),
for a specific target average secrecy rate C¯0 between the
access point and the sink, the number of sinks must satisfy
λsk > C¯0Λ2
ln 2
piε
, (15)
where ε =
∫∞
0
exp{−piλape /(Λ2x
2/β)}
(1+x)x2/β
dx.
C. Overall Average Secrecy Rate
In this subsection, we derive the overall average secrecy rate
in three-tier WSNs. The instantaneous secrecy rate is defined
as Cs = min
(
Caps , C
sk
s
)
. As such, the overall average secrecy
rate is calculated as
C¯s =
∫ ∞
0
xfCs (x) dx =
∫ ∞
0
(1− FCs (x))dx, (16)
where fCs (x) and FCs (x) is the probability density function
(PDF) and the CDF of Cs, respectively. The CDF of Cs is
calculated as
FCs (x) = Pr
(
min
(
Caps , C
sk
s
)
< x
)
= 1− Pr
(
min
(
Caps , C
sk
s
)
> x
)
= 1− Pr (Caps > x) Pr
(
Csks > x
)
. (17)
Substituting (17) into (16), we have
C¯s =
∫ ∞
0
Pr (Caps > x) Pr
(
Csks > x
)
dx, (18)
where
Pr (Caps > x) = 1−
∫ ∞
0
fγs,e (t)Fγap (2
x (1 + t)− 1)dt
(19)
and
Pr
(
Csks > x
)
= 1−
∫ ∞
0
fγap,e (t)Fγsk (2
x (1 + t)− 1)dt.
(20)
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. λs = 10
−2
, ρs = 0.01,
λap = 10
−2
, ρap = 0.1, α = 3.5, Pap = 25 dBm.
Here, fγs,e is the derivative of Fγs,e given in (7), and fγap,e
is the derivative of Fγap,e given in (12).
Unfortunately, the derived overall average secrecy rate be-
tween the sensor and the sink is not in a simple form, which
motivates us to consider the interference-limited case with
single antenna at the access point, as presented in the following
corollary.
Corollary 3. When the access points are equipped with
single antenna in the interference-limited scenario, the overall
average secrecy rate between the sensor and the sink is given
by
C¯s =
∫ ∞
0
[∫ ∞
0
2piλse
αΛ1y2/α+1
exp
{
−piλse
/(
Λ1y
2/α
)}
piλap (1− ρap)
Λ1(2x (1 + y)− 1)
2/α
+ piλap (1− ρap)
dy
]
[∫ ∞
0
2pi2λape λsk exp
{
−piλape
/
Λ2y
2/β
}
βΛ2y2/β+1
(
Λ2(2x (1 + y)− 1)
2/β + piλsk
)dy
]
dx,
(21)
where Λ1 =
(
λsρs + λapρapµ
2
α
)
piΓ (1 + 2/α) Γ (1− 2/α)
and Λ2 = λapρappiΓ (1 + 2/β) Γ (1− 2/β) .
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we present numerical examples to show
the average secrecy rate of the three-tier WSN. We assume
that the sensor’s transmit power Ps = 15 dBm, the power
spectral density of noise is −170 dBm/Hz, and the bandwidth
is 1 MHz. We also assume that all the channel gains follow
a complex Gaussian distribution with zero mean and unit
variance. In all the figures, we see a precise match between
the simulations and the exact analytical curves, which validate
our analysis.
A. Average Secrecy Rate between Sensor and Access Point
Fig. 2 plots the average secrecy rate between the sensor
and the access point versus λse/λs. The analytical results are
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Fig. 3. The average secrecy rate versus λs. ρs = 0.05, ρap = 0.5, λse =
10
−3
, α = 3.5, Pap = 25 dBm.
obtained from (8). We first see that the average secrey rate
decreases with increasing the density of eavesdroppers that
intercepts the transmission between sensor and access point,
due to the detrimental effects of eavesdropping. We also see
that the average secrecy rate increases with increasing the
number of antennas at the access point, which results from
the array again brought by using MRC at the access point.
Fig. 3 plots the average secrecy rate between the sensor
and the access point versus λs for various λap and M .
The analytical results are obtained from (8). An interesting
observation is that for the same number of antennas M , the
average secrecy rate is nearly invariable for λs < 2 × 10−3,
since the interference from other sensors is much smaller than
the interference from the active access points, and slightly
increasing the interference from the sensor imposes negligible
effect on the performance. However, when λs > 2 × 10−3,
the interference from other sensors is comparable with the
interference from the active access points, and increasing the
interference from the sensor degrades the secrecy performance.
We also observe that increasing λap increases the average
secrecy rate. This is because with more access points, the
distance between the typical sensor and the typical access
point becomes shorter, which improves the average secrecy
rate. In addition, we find that increasing λap slows down the
decreasing trend of average secrecy rate when λs increases.
B. Average Secrecy Rate between Access point and Sink
Fig. 4 plots the average secrecy rate between the access
point and the sink versus λape /λap for various λap and M . The
analytical results are obtained from (13). We first observe that
the average secrecy rate decreases with increasing λape /λap,
which indicates that more access points need to be deployed
as the density of eavesdroppers increases, to combat eaves-
dropping. Second, with the same number of antennas at the
access point, the average secrecy rate decreases with increasing
λape . The average secrecy rate between the access point and
the sink improves with increasing the number of antennas at
the access point M .
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Fig. 5 plots the average secrecy rate between the access
point and the sink versus λap for various λsk and M . The
analytical results are obtained from (13). We observe that the
average secrecy rate alters slightly for λap < 2 × 10−3, and
decreases with increasing λap for λap > 2×10−3. This can be
explained by the fact that for λap < 2×10−3, the interference
from the active access points is relatively small compared with
the noise, and increasing the number of access points scarcely
influence the performance. However, for λap > 2 × 10−3,
the interference from the access point imposes a dominant
impact on the SINR between the access point and the sink, thus
increasing the interference from the access points degrades the
average secrecy rate. Another observation is that the average
secrecy rate improves with increasing the density of sink,
because the distance between the typical access point and the
corresponding sink becomes shorter.
C. Overall Average Secrecy Rate
Fig. 6 plots the overall average secrecy rate versus λap for
various λs and λsk . The analytical results are obtained from
(18). Interestingly, we find that the overall average secrecy
rate first increases, and then decreases with increasing λap,
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which implies that there exists an optimal λap to achieve the
maximum average secrecy rate. This phenomenon can be well
explained by the tradeoff between the benefits brought by the
shorter distance from the typical sensor to the typical access
point and the detrimental effects caused by more interference
from the active access points due to increasing λap. It is also
seen that the overall average secrecy rate can be improved
by deploying more sinks, due to the shorter distance between
the access point and the sink. It is further demonstrated
that deploying more sensors in this network may not greatly
degrade the average secrecy rate due to the low transmit power
of sensors. More importantly, it is shown that the optimal λap
is more dependent on the λsk.
Fig. 7 plots the overall average secrecy rate versus λap for
various λse, λape and M . The analytical results are obtained
from (18). Similar as Fig. 6, we see that the overall average
secrecy rate first increases, and then decreases with increasing
λap. As expected, the average secrecy rate decreases with
increasing eavesdroppers. It is indicated that the optimal λap
for achieving the maximum average secrecy rate does not alter
drastically with different λse and λape .
8V. CONCLUSION
We have analyzed the physical layer security of three-tier
WSNs. We have examined the impact of random locations
and spatial densities of sensors, access points, sinks, and
external eavesdroppers on the secrecy performance. We have
also obtained new expressions for the average secrecy rate.
Based on our analysis, we have established the importance of
physical layer security in three-tier WSNs, where our results
support useful guidelines on secure transmission in practical
WSNs. An important result is the minimum number of sinks
required for a target average secrecy rate, which facilitates
secure node deployment design in WSNs.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
From (1), the CDF of γap is given by
Fγap (γth) =
∫ ∞
0
Pr
[‖hs0,ap0‖2r−α
Inap + δ2
/
Ps
≤ γth
]
f|Xs0,ap0 |
(r) dr
=
∫ ∞
0
Pr
[‖hs0,ap0‖2|Xs0,ap0 |−α
Inap + δ2
/
Ps
≤ γth
]
2piλap
(1− ρap) r exp
(
−piλap (1− ρap) r
2
)
dr,
(A.1)
where f|Xs0,ap0 | (r) is the PDF of the nearest distance between
the access point and the typical sensor. The CDF of the access
point SINR at distance r from its corresponding sensor is given
as
Pr
[‖hs0,ap0‖2r−α
Inap + δ2
/
Ps
≤ γth
]
= 1−
M−1∑
m=0
1
m!
EΦs,a
{
EΦap,a
{∫ ∞
0
[
γthr
α
(
τ + δ2
/
Ps
)]m
exp
[
−γthr
α
(
τ + δ2
/
Ps
)]
dPr (Inap ≤ τ )
}}
. (A.2)
We then substitute
(
−
(
τ + δ2
/
Ps
)
γth
)m
e−(τ+δ
2/Ps)γ{s}th r
α
=
dm
(
e
−γthx(τ+δ2/Ps)
)
dxm
∣∣∣∣∣∣
x=rα
into (A.2), we rewrite the CDF
of the access point SINR at distance r from its corresponding
sensor as
Pr
[‖hs0,ap0‖2r−α
Inap + δ2
/
Ps
≤ γth
]
=1−EΦs,a
{
EΦap,a
{
∫ ∞
0
exp
[
−γthr
α
(
τ + δ2
/
Ps
)]
dPr (Inap ≤ τ )
}}
−
M−1∑
m=1
(rα)
m
m!(−1)
mEΦs,a
{
EΦap,a
{
∫ ∞
0
dm
(
e−γthx(τ+δ
2/Ps)
)
dxm
∣∣∣∣∣∣
x=rα
dPr (Inap ≤ τ)
}}
= 1− exp
(
−γthr
αδ2
/
Ps
)
LInap (γthr
α)
−
M−1∑
m=1
(rα)m
m!(−1)
m
dm
(
exp
(
−γthxδ
2
/
Ps
)
LInap (γthx)
)
dxm
∣∣∣∣∣
x=rα
.
(A.3)
Remind that Is,ap =
∑
i∈Φs,a\{s0}
∣∣∣∣ hs0,ap0†‖hs0,ap0‖hi,ap0
∣∣∣∣2|Xi,ap0 |−α,
using Slivnyak’s theorem, the Laplace transform of Is,ap is
LIs,ap (s)
= EΦs

exp

−s ∑
i∈Φs,a\{s0}
∣∣∣∣∣ hs0,ap0
†
‖hs0,ap0‖
hi,ap0
∣∣∣∣∣
2
|Xi,ap0 |
−α




(a)
= exp
{
−2piλsρs
∫ ∞
0
(
1− L hs0,ap0 †
‖hs0,ap0‖
hi,ap0
(
sy−α
))
ydy
}
(b)
= exp
{
−2piλsρs
∫ ∞
0
(
1−
1
1 + sy−α
)
ydy
}
= exp
{
−λsρspiΓ (1 + 2/α) Γ (1− 2/α) s
2/α
}
, (A.4)
In (A.4), (a) follows from the generating functionnal of HPPP
in [23], (b) follows from the fact that
∣∣∣∣ hs0,ap0 †‖hs0,ap0‖hi,ap0
∣∣∣∣2 ∼
exp (1).
Since Iap,ap = µ
∑
j∈Φap,a\{ap0}
∣∣∣∣ hs0,ap0†‖hs0,ap0‖Hj,ap0 hj,skj
†
‖hj,skj‖
∣∣∣∣2
|Xj,ap0 |
−α
= µ
∑
j∈Φap\{ap0}
H
ap,ap
j |Xj,ap0 |
−α
, the Laplace
transform of Iap,ap is
LIap,ap (s)
= exp
(
−∫
[
1−Eh
(
exp
(
−sµHap,apj y
−α
))]
λapρap2piydy
)
(c)
= exp
{
−λapρappiµ
2
α
Eh
{(
H
ap,ap
j
) 2
α
}
Γ
(
1−
2
α
)
s
2
α
}
(d)
= exp
{
−λapρappiµ
2
αΓ (1 + 2/α) Γ (1− 2/α) s2/α
}
,
(A.5)
where (c) follows from the generating functionnal of HPPP in
[23], (d) follows from Hj ∼ exp (1).
With the Laplace transform of Is,ap and Iap,ap, we derive
the Laplace transform of Inap as
LInap (s) = LIs,ap (s)LIap,ap (s) =
exp
{
−
(
λsρs + λapρapµ
2
α
)
piΓ (1 + 2/α) Γ (1− 2/α) s2/α
}
.
(A.6)
Substituting (A.6) into (A.3), we obtain
Pr
[‖hs0,ap0‖2r−α
Inap + δ2
/
Ps
≤ γth
]
= 1− exp
{
−
(
λsρs + λapρapµ
2
α
)
piΓ (1 + 2/α) Γ (1− 2/α) (γth)
2/α
r2−γthr
αδ2
/
Ps
}
−
M−1∑
m=1
(rα)
m
m!(−1)
m
dm (V (x))
dxm
∣∣∣∣
x=rα
, (A.7)
where V (x) = exp
{
−
(
λsρs + λapρapµ
2
α
)
piΓ (1 + 2/α)
Γ (1− 2/α) (γthx)
2/α
− γthxδ
2
/
Ps
}
.
We then apply the Faa` di Bruno’s formula to solve the
9derivative of mth order as follows:
Pr
[‖hs0,ap0‖2r−α
Inap + δ2
/
Ps
≤ γth
]
= 1− exp
{
−
(
λsρs + λapρapµ
2
α
)
piΓ (1 + 2/α) Γ (1− 2/α)(γth)
2/α
r2 − γthr
αδ2
/
Ps
}
−
M−1∑
m=1
(rα)m
(−1)
m
∑ 1
m∏
l=1
ml!l!ml
exp
{
−
(
λsρs + λapρapµ
2/α
)
piΓ (1 + 2/α) Γ (1− 2/α)(γth)
2/α
r2 − γthr
αδ2
/
Ps
}
[
−2/α
(
λsρs + λapρapµ
2/α
)
piΓ (1 + 2/α) Γ (1− 2/α)
(γth)
2
α r(2−α)−γthδ
2
/
Ps
]m1 m∏
l=2
[
−
(
λsρs + λapρapµ
2/α
)
piΓ (1 + 2/α) Γ (1− 2/α) (γth)
2
α
l−1∏
j=0
(2/α− j) r2−lα
]ml
.
(A.8)
Substituting (A.8) into (A.1), we derive the CDF of γap in
(6).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
From (2), the CDF of γs,e is given by
Fγs,e (γth) = Pr
{
max
ek∈Φs,e
{
|hs0,ek |
2
|Xs0,ek |
−α
Ins,e + δ2
/
Ps
}
≤ γth
}
(a)
= exp
{
−λse ∫
R2
e−δ
2γth|Xs0,ek |
α/PsLIns,e (γth|Xs0,ek |
α
)
d |Xs0,ek |}
(b)
= exp
{
−2piλse
∫ ∞
0
e−δ
2γthr
α/PsLIns,e (γthr
α) rdr
}
,
(B.1)
where (a) follows from the generating functionnal of HPPP
in [23], (b) is obtained by converting cartesian coordinates to
polar coordinates.
Using the generating functionnal of HPPP in [23], |hi,ek |2 ∼
exp (1), and Hap,ej =
∣∣∣∣hj,ek hj,skj †‖hj,skj‖
∣∣∣∣2 ∼ exp (1), we derive
the Laplace transform of Is,e and Iap,e as
LIs,e (s)
= exp
(
−∫
[
1−Eh
(
exp
(
−s|hi,ek |
2
y−α
))]
λsρs2piydy
)
= exp
{
−λsρspiΓ (1 + 2/α) Γ (1− 2/α) s
2/α
}
, (B.2)
and
LIap,e (s)
= exp
(
−∫
[
1−Eh
(
exp
(
−sµHap,ej y
−α
))]
λapρap2piydy
)
= exp
{
−λapρappiµ
2
αΓ (1 + 2/α) Γ (1− 2/α) s2/α
}
,
(B.3)
respectively.
With the Laplace transform of Is,e and Iap,e, we derive the
Laplace transform of Ins,e as
LIns,e (s) = exp
{
−λsρspiΓ (1 + 2/α) Γ (1− 2/α) s
2/α − λap
ρappiµ
2/αΓ (1 + 2/α) Γ (1− 2/α) s2/α
}
. (B.4)
Substituting (B.4) into (D.1), we derive the CDF of γs,e in
(7).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
From (3), the CDF of γsk is given by
Fγsk (γth) =
∫ ∞
0
Pr
[
‖gap0,Sk0‖
2
r−β
Inap,sk + δ2
/
Pap
≤ γth
]
2piλskr
exp
(
−piλskr
2
)
dr. (C.1)
The CDF of the sink SINR at distance r from its corre-
sponding access point is derived as
Pr
[
‖gap0,sk0‖
2
r−β
Inap,sk + δ2
/
Pap
≤ γth
]
= 1−
M−1∑
m=0
1
m!
EΦap,a
{∫ ∞
0
[
γthr
β
(
τ + δ2
/
Pap
)]m
exp
[
−γthr
β
(
τ + δ2
/
Pap
)]
dPr (Inap,sk ≤ τ)
}
.
(C.2)
Note that
(
−
(
τ + δ2
/
Pap
)
γth
)m
e−(τ+δ
2/Pap)γ{s}th r
β
=
dm
(
e
−γthx(τ+δ2/Pap)
)
dxm
∣∣∣∣∣∣
x=rβ
, we rewrite (C.2) as
Pr
[
‖gap0,sk0‖
2
r−β
Inap,sk + δ2
/
Pap
≤ γth
]
=1−EΦap,a{∫ ∞
0
exp
[
−γthr
β
(
τ + δ2
/
Pap
)]
dPr (Inap,sk ≤ τ)
}
−
M−1∑
m=1
(
rβ
)m
m!(−1)
mEΦap,a


∫ ∞
0
dm
(
e−γthx(τ+δ
2/Pap)
)
dxm
∣∣∣∣∣∣
x=rβ
dPr (Inap,sk ≤ τ )
}
= 1− exp
(
−γthr
βδ2
/
Pap
)
LInap,sk
(
γthr
β
)
−
M−1∑
m=1
(
rβ
)m
m!(−1)
m
dm
(
exp
(
−γthxδ
2
/
Pap
)
LInap,sk (γthx)
)
dxm
∣∣∣∣∣
x=rβ
. (C.3)
Since Inap,sk =
∑
j∈Φap,a\{ap0}
∣∣∣∣gj,sk0 hj,skj †‖hj,skj‖
∣∣∣∣2|Xj,sk0 |−β ,
using the generating functionnal of HPPP and∣∣∣∣gj,Sk0 hj,skj †‖hj,skj‖
∣∣∣∣2 ∼ exp (1) , we derive the Laplace
transform of Inap,sk as
LInap,sk (s) = exp
{
−λapρappiΓ (1 + 2/β) Γ (1− 2/β) s
2/β
}
.
(C.4)
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Substituting (C.4) into (C.3), we obtain
Pr
[
‖gap0,sk0‖
2
r−β
Inap,sk + δ2
/
Pap
≤ γth
]
= 1− exp
{
−λapρappi
Γ (1 + 2/β) Γ (1− 2/β) (γth)
2/β
r2 − γthr
βδ2
/
Pap
}
−
M−1∑
m=1
(
rβ
)m
m!(−1)
m
dm (U (x))
dxm
∣∣∣∣
x=rβ
(C.5)
with U (x) = exp
{
−λapρappiΓ (1 + 2/β) Γ (1− 2/β) (γthx)
2/β
−γthxδ
2
/
Pap
}
.
We then apply the Faa` di Bruno’s formula to solve the
derivative of mth order as follows:
dm [exp (U (x))]
dxm
∣∣∣∣
x=rβ
=
∑ 1
m∏
l=1
ml!l!ml
exp
{
−λapρappi
Γ (1 + 2/β) Γ (1− 2/β) (γth)
2/β
r2 − γthr
βδ2
/
Pap
}[
− λap
ρappi
2
β
Γ (1 + 2/β) Γ (1− 2/β) (γth)
2/β
x2/β−1 − γthδ
2
/
Pap
]m1
m∏
l=2
[
− λapρappiΓ (1 + 2/β) Γ (1− 2/β) (γth)
2/β
l−1∏
j=0
(2/β − j)
x2/β−l
]ml
. (C.6)
Based on (C.6), (C.5), and (C.1), we derive the CDF of γsk
in (11).
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
From (4), the CDF of γap,e is given by
Fγs,e (γth) = EΦap,a
{
EΦap,e
{ ∏
eΦap,e
Pr
{
|gap0,ek |
2
Inap,e + σ2
/
Pap
|Xap0,ek |
−β
≤ γth
∣∣∣∣∣Φap,a,Φap,e
}}
(a)
= exp
{
−λape
∫
R2
e
−σ2γth|Xap0,ek |
β
/
Pap
LInap,e
(
γth|Xap0,ek |
β
)
de
}
(b)
= exp
{
−2piλape
∫ ∞
0
e−σ
2γthr
β/PapLInap,e
(
γthr
β
)
rdr
}
,
(D.1)
where (a) follows from the generating functionnal of HPPP
in [23], (b) is obtained by converting cartesian coordinates to
polar coordinates.
Using the generating functionnal of HPPP in [23], we derive
the Laplace transform of Iap,e as
LIap,e (s) = exp
{
−λapρappiΓ (1 + 2/β) Γ (1− 2/β) s
2/β
}
.
(D.2)
Plugging (D.2) into (D.1), we derive the CDF of γs,e in
(12).
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